Sour grapes and sweet victories: How actions shape preferences

Vinckier*, F., Rigoux*, L., Kurniawan*, I.T., Hu, C., Bourgeois-Gironde, S., Daunizeau, J., Pessiglione, M.

PLoS computational biology. 15(1):e1006499

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Abstract

Classical decision theory postulates that choices proceed from subjective values assigned to the probable outcomes of alternative actions. Some authors have argued that opposite causality should also be envisaged, with choices influencing subsequent values expressed in desirability ratings. The idea is that agents may increase their ratings of items that they have chosen in the first place, which has been typically explained by the need to reduce cognitive dissonance. However, evidence in favor of this reverse causality has been the topic of intense debates that have not reached consensus so far. Here, we take a novel approach using Bayesian techniques to compare models in which choices arise from stable (but noisy) underlying values (one-way causality) versus models in which values are in turn influenced by choices (two-way causality). Moreover, we examined whether in addition to choices, other components of previous actions, such as the effort invested and the eventual action outcome (success or failure), could also impact subsequent values. Finally, we assessed whether the putative changes in values were only expressed in explicit ratings, or whether they would also affect other value-related behaviors such as subsequent choices. Behavioral data were obtained from healthy participants in a rating-choice-rating-choice-rating paradigm, where the choice task involves deciding whether or not to exert a given physical effort to obtain a particular food item. Bayesian selection favored two-way causality models, where changes in value due to previous actions affected subsequent ratings, choices and action outcomes. Altogether, these findings may help explain how values and actions drift when several decisions are made successively, hence highlighting some shortcomings of classical decision theory.

Author summary

The standard way to explain decisions is the so-called valuation/selection model, which includes 1) a value function that calculates desirability for every possible outcome of alternative actions and 2) a choice function that integrates outcome values and generates selection probability for every action. In this classical view, choices are therefore determined (in a probabilistic sense) by hidden values. However, some authors have argued that causality could also be reversed, meaning that values may in turn be influenced by choices. Yet existing demonstrations of reverse causality have been criticized because pseudo-effects may arise from statistical artifacts. Here, we take a novel computational approach that directly compares models with and without the existence of reverse causality, on the basis of behavioral data obtained from volunteers in a new task. The winning model is a generalization of the reverse causality hypothesis, showing that people tend to like more the items that they previously chose to pursue, and even more if they did obtain these items. These effects were manifest not only in desirability ratings but also in subsequent actions, showing that value changes were more profound than just verbal statements. Altogether, our results invite reconsideration of decision theory, showing that actions are not neutral to the values driving them, hence suggesting that the history of actions should be taken into account.